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Abstract
This essay provides measurements of the economic determinants of
procurement procedures used by federal agencies to acquire mainframe
computers. It shows how economic models of bidding behavior can provide
structure for econometric measurement. In the model of this paper, the
higher the probability that an agency anticipates more than one vendor will
bid on a request, the greater the likelihood that the agency will choose to
use competitive procedures. The analysis shows that the extent of
experience a buyer had with a vendor could have influenced the likelihood
of sole-sourcing with that incumbent. In most cases, however, other
economic factors dominated, especially those related to the extent of
competition or the value of a procurement. Another good predictor of a
competitive procurement is whether a federal agency's office had experience
with IBM. This either indicates that the federal Mainframe market contained
many competitors who competed against IBM, or it indicates that the federal
oversight processes forced offices who had used IBM in the past to use
competitive procedures more often.
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I Introduction
Virtually every civilian agency and military installation has one or
more general purpose mainframe computer. Despite their similarity in
functions, there is surprising variance in the procurement procedures used
to purchase these machines. Agencies choose to use either competitive
procedures or sole-sourcing. Competitive bidding involves the solicitation
of multiple bids. In sole-sourcing, however, solicitation of competitive
bids is bypassed and a single vendor is designated as a "sole-supplier."
What are the important economic determinants of this procedural choice —
the user's previous experience with a vendor, the value of the procurement,
conditions of supply, or the identity of the incumbent vendor?
Despite much recent interest in the theoretical and empirical
economics of procurement, no researcher has tried to quantify and measure
the factors influencing the choice of procurement procedures. This paper
fills this gap by developing an approach for measuring the economic
determinants of the procedural choice used to acquire a commercially
standardized product, in this case, general purpose mainframe computers.
One of the main insights of this paper is that behavioral models of bidding
can provide structure for statistical measurement of the economic
determinants of the choice of procedure. This is due to the causal links
between the anticipated (but unobserved) number of bidders in a market and
the observed (and endogenous) choice of procurement procedures by federal
agencies.
The methods used in this paper resemble in spirit those found in
recent models of firm entry into diverse geographic markets or new product
markets. As in Bresnahan and Reiss (1986, 1987) and Reiss and Spiller
(1990) , the econometric analysis retains the structure of behavioral models
of latent discrete decisions. In this case, however, the discrete decision
concerns an agency's choice of procedures in anticipation of the decision
of computer vendors about whether or not to bid. In addition, as in Berry
(1987) and Lane (1989) , the econometric structure is designed to measure
the influence of a vendor's previous experiences on the profitability of
subsequent actions. However, unlike Berry and Lane, which measured the
relevance of a producer's previous production experience, this analysis
focuses on the relevance of a vendor's previous interaction with a
potential repeat customer.
\
Two issues shape the use of bidding models for econometric measurement
of procedural choice. First, the extent of an incumbent's advantage in
bidding, however measured, should indicate the likelihood of sole-sourcing
with that incumbent and the unlikelihood of sole-sourcing with a non-
incumbent. Hence, an appropriate econometric structure must distinguish
between the two sole-sourcing outcomes and the different factors that
produce them. Second, disclosure laws prevent observers from learning
details about who lost competitive bids. Yet, economic models of bidding
identify causal links between the competitiveness of a procurement and
unobserved decisions of bidders about whether or not to bid. If the
determinants of those unobserved decisions can be measured and linked to
behavioral outcomes, then an econometric model can measure the importance i
of the various determinants of procedural choice. •
The results of this study shed light on several of the micro-economic
,
forces influencing the competitiveness of the federal computer market. i
Since switching costs can be quite high in this product market, it is
expected that incumbents have advantages in bidding. While this factor does
influence outcomes in this paper's sample, quite often other economic
factors were more important. The extent of potential competition in a
market segment and the value of a requested procurement are particularly-
important determinants of procedural choice. In addition, as found in
Greenstein (1990), a buyer will behave differently if he has had experience
with IBM's systems. This result implies that either many firms offered
close substitutes for IBM products, resulting in more competitive bidding,
or the federal oversight process systematically forced offices who
previously used IBM to use more competitive procedures.
There is one important restriction to the methods and results
developed here; they apply only to situations in which the potential buyer
has experience with a single incumbent. This restriction reduces the
complexity of the behavioral and econometric model, and it eases the
computation of an "incumbent's advantage." The additional problems of
multiple-incumbent situations will be addressed in later research.
II A Simple Description of Computer Procurement Procedural Choice
Government agencies distinguish between several phases in the
procurement process for mainframe computers:^ (1) phase in which both the
functional needs and requirements of an agency's office are defined and
funds are committed; (2) phase in which representatives from the agency's
office and vendor representatives prepare for the final solicitation by
clarifying benchmarks and requirements; (3) phase in which bids are
formally requested, evaluated, and awarded.
Sole-sourcing is distinguished from competition in the way an agency's
office proceeds through phases (2) and (3). Competition means that agencies
follow procedures designed to elicit multiple bidders in phase (3). In
contrast, sole-sourcing typically means that an agency's office negotiates
a contract with a single vendor of choice. Sole-sourcing bypasses many of
the procedures associated with soliciting multiple bids in phases (2) and
(3).
Agencies face several trade-offs when choosing between sole-sourcing
and competition. Competitive procedures can elicit unanticipated bids,
though this is not likely to be a major factor with most commercial
mainframe acquisitions. Competitive procedures are also thought to result
in lower prices. Not all agencies may care about savings, however,
especially when acquisitions are funded from congressional capital funds.
On the other hand, sole-sourcing results in speedier delivery of systems
since it skips phases (2) and (3) . Similarly, sole sourcing also avoids
potential protests associated with phases (2) and (3) , which can also delay
delivery^. Sole-sourcing also gives the agency absolute control over vendor
choice. This is valued by agencies when decisions under competitive
procedures are subject to critical outside scrutiny. \
If agencies completely controlled the choice of procurement procedures
and could anticipate bidder reactions to written specifications, then they
would likely choose sole-sourcing when only one bidder was anticipated.
When only one vendor can profitably bid, there is nothing gained by using
competitive procedures. Of course, the net gains of sole-sourcing diminish
when more than one vendor can profitably bid.
Many factors influence the number of anticipated bidders. The supply
of "off-the-shelf" alternatives for different types of requests will
influence the expected number of bidders. The costs of bidding will also
vary, and this will influence the expected profitability of bidding and,
thus, the anticipated number of bidders. Agencies also have limited direct
control over the expected profitability of bidding. A forward-looking
agency can write technical specifications so that one or another vendor is
favored in a competitive bid.* If agencies completely controlled the
procurement process, then sole-sourcing would be just a case in which
procedures were manipulated so that only one vendor could profitably bid.
Oversight procedures could potentially change some of these factors.
Under the Brooks Act (1965), public law 36-809, the General Services
Administration (GSA) holds the right to approve all procedures used to
acquire mainframe computers, as well as rule on protests. It is widely
believed that GSA discouraged the use of sole-sourcing in the 1970s,
resulting in more frequent use of competitive procedures. It is also widely
believed that GSA's procedures limit an agency's ability to manipulate
specifications. Thus, sole-sourcing could potentially have been a mixed
blessing in the 1970s ,° "frequent" use could have triggered significant
scrutiny of purchases by GSA or Congressman Jack Brooks, author of the
Brooks Act and member of the House Government Operations Committee. More
will be said about this later. t
I
Ill A Simple Econometric Exercise
To gain insight into the influence of economic forces on procedural
choice, I assembled a sample of computer mainframe acquisitions from 1971
through 1983 by comparing adjacent years of the federal inventories of
computer holdings by federal agencies.^ The sample of systems is restricted
to commercially available mainframes, where information on the
characteristics of the commercial systems was more readily available. This
selection procedure eliminated systems that were purchased for special
government functions, particularly in the defense department. It tended to
bias the sample towards systems that were acquired for applications in the
federal government that resembled the use of mainframes in private
industry, such as keeping inventories or large data bases.
The unit of analysis became the acquisition of a computer system at an
agency office or "site",^ which was dated with the acquisition of the first
processor in a system at that site (the records do not reveal which system
supplier (s) lost the award nor what alternatives the losers offered) . The
inventories reveal something about an agency's purchase history prior to
the purchases of this acquisition. Each observation was appended with
information about the market for systems like i:he one acquired. Of over
2200 acquisitions from external suppliers recovered, 526 mainframe
Q
acquisitions had all the necessary information, 118 used sole-sourcing.
I restricted my attention to the 221 acquisitions in the sample that
O
occurred at sites that had no more than one incumbent vendor (41 of those
used sole-sourcing) . This restriction is imposed because it significantly
simplifies the model discussed later. It also had the secondary benefit of
eliminating many multi-vendor users in the Departments of Energy and
Defense, and increasing the probability of observing system acquisitions
for activities analogous to private mainframe system use -- simple,
repetitive calculation using large data-bases . ^° Since the remaining
vendors are large firms (i.e. IBM, Sperry-Univac, Honeywell, Burroughs, and
Control Data Corporation) , it is possible to get from private censuses a
reasonably good idea of the state of the private market for these
commercial mainframes. Later work will try to generalize these methods to
multi-incumbent situations.
<
The description of the procurement process, outlined previously, j
suggests that a simple probit of competition versus sole-sourcing provides
an appropriate measure of the factors influencing vendor choice. The
description shows that in phase (1) buyers first write technical
specifications that reflect the office's preferences among types of systems
and that may or may not favor incumbent vendors. Vendors then commit to
bidding in phase (2) , anticipating a bidding game to supply an alternative,
as in phase (3). Thus, when choosing whether to go through with competitive
procedures in stages (2) and (3), agencies anticipate vendors' decisions to
bid." Let bidding follows the rule:
(1) Bid if Ett* > 0,
Do not bid if Ett* < 0,
where Ett* are the expected profits, broadly interpreted as the total gains
to bidding, less the costs to bidding. Ett* varies depending on who bids and
how many vendors bid and is assumed to be a function of characteristics of
the market and costs of supply. Following Bresnahan and Reiss (1986) , to
measure the factors producing a single bidder rather than a multiple number
of bidders, one simply has to index the profit function for the second |
bidder and specify an error distribution. If the error is distributed
normally then this results in a probit.
j
Unfortunately, a simple probit is not adequate here, because it cannot
measure the relative importance of an incumbent's advantage. If observers
want to measure the importance of an incumbent's advantage, it is necessary
to distinguish between the two sole-sourcing outcomes. This is because the
extent of an incumbent's advantage in bidding, however measured, should
positively predict the likelihood of sole-sourcing with that incumbent, ani
it should predict the unlikelihood of sole-sourcing with a non-incumbent
(
In addition, it is informative to distinguish between the two competitive
outcomes. If an incumbent does not win a competitive bid, it may be because
he bid and lost or he may not have bid at all. When an incumbent wins a
competitive bid, then it is known with certainty (trivially) that the
incumbent bid.
There is also good reason to think that incumbents should have
advantages in competitive bidding and in getting sole-source bids.^ It is
thought that incumbent vendors can easily acquire knowledge about the
idiosyncratic needs of a buyer; Hence, an incumbent is more likely than a
challenger to know precisely how to satisfy a user's unique needs (Kelman
1990, pg. 70). Case studies have also shown that incumbents are at
advantages because buyers incur costs when switching suppliers -- for such
things as software conversion, personnel retraining, and investment in
technically complementary assets (GAO 1979, OSD 1983b, or NBS 1980).^^
The frequency of outcomes in this sample is illustrated in Figure 1.
The figure shows the relevance of the criticism of a probit. When there is
a single incumbent, every possible outcome occurred: (SI) An incumbent
vendor is the sole-source; (SC) A non-incumbent vendor is the sole-source;
(CI) A competitive procurement takes place and the incumbent vendor makes
the winning bid; (CC) A competitive procurement takes place and some non-
incumbent vendor makes the winning bid. Also shown in figure 1 are the two
outcomes in which there is no incumbent vendor: (SNI) There was no
incumbent system vendor at a site^^ and the new acquisition was sole-
sourced; (CNI) There was no incumbent vendor at the site and the new
equipment was acquired in a competitive bidding process. Clearly, a model
more sophisticated than a probit is required.
IV A Behavioral Model with Incumbent's Advantages
This section develops an explicit extensive form game that could
plausibly produce the outcomes observed in Figure 1. It is developed with
the presumption that an agency anticipates potential bidder behavior, and
8those expectations influence the agency's choice of procurement procedure.
If only a bid from the incumbent computer vendor is anticipated, the agenc^^
sole-sources with the incumbent (i.e. outcome SI). If only a bid from one 1
challenger is anticipated, the agency sole-sources with the challenger
(i.e. outcome SC) . More than one anticipated bidder results in competitive
bidding procedures. When an incumbent competes against a non-incumbent, the
winner cannot be predicted (i.e. outcome CI or CC) . However, if multiple
challengers bid but the incumbent does not, then it is certain that a non-
incumbent will win (i.e. outcome CC) . Thus, in the following game
predicting incumbent and non-incumbent bidding will be tantamount to
predicting choice of procurement procedure.
The most important point of this section is that there is a
correspondence between the value of expected profit functions in a simple
bidding model for a potential repeat customer and observed outcomes. i
Consider a model of bidding behavior in which the buyer has had experience
;
with a single incumbent supplier prior to soliciting bids. Solving this
model requires knowing the expected profits of the incumbent and challenger
computer vendors under different bidding situations — when the incumbent
computer vendor bids and when he does not, when no challenger bids, when j
one challenger bids, and when two challengers bid. These situations are
represented in extensive form in Figure 2 in a diagram in which no more j
than two challengers can bid, though the analysis will generalize to an '
arbitrary number of challengers.^^ Profit functions with superscripts I and
C index incumbent or challenger. Numbers index different situations. In
principle, these profits are functions an agency's manipulation of
specifications, as well as characteristics of potential computer vendors.
Under five different assumptions about the bidding game, three
functions will determine the unique equilibrium outcomes in Figure 2. The
first assumption used in this paper is that incumbent vendors move first
and act in accordance with a sub-game perfect equilibrium. This assumption
is equivalent to assuming that incumbents know a little sooner about a
potential bid and all potential challengers know about the incumbent's I
bidding decision when making their bidding decision. The incumbent bids
anticipating the challenger's decisions.^*
Second, assume that tt'i is positive or ir^A, is positive or both are
positive. This is the same as incorporating one constraint the computer
inventory data imposes on any empirical work: In a sample of observed
acquisitions, it must be the case that at least one vendor, either an
incumbent or challenger, can profitably bid on a procurement. At any rate,
in practice violations of this assumption is rare; why would an agency go
through a procurement if it did not anticipate any bidders?
Third, assume that both challengers and incumbents have the same
information — specifically, estimates of the probability of winning, the
costs of bidding, and the net profitability of winning. This is plausible
since the vendors in the commercial mainframe market know each other quite
well and generally have access to the same (generally public) information
about buyers.
Fourth, assume that more competitors reduce expected profits. This
imposes the constraint that the profit functions always satisfy the
following: 7r'^2 < ir'^4 , it'^2 < tt'^5 , tt'i > 7r'2 > tt's, 7r'^2 < 7r'^3 , and n'^A > n^S.
These constraints seem innocuous since most reasonable models of bidding in
the computer market would imply that similar inequalities held.
Finally, assume that weak challengers cannot make an otherwise
profitable incumbent unprofitable. This is tantamount to assuming that the
inequalities 7r'2 < 0, tt'i > 0, and 7r'^2 < cannot all hold at the same time.
It is convenient to set the probability of this unlikely event to zero.
1 R
Moreover, results do not appear to be sensitive to this assumption.
Figure 3 lists the algebraic conditions sufficient to result in an
equilibrium in Figure 2 (and in one of the six outcomes in Figure 1) . With
the previously mentioned assumptions, three profit functions are sufficient
to determine a unique equilibrium in Figure 1 (see Greenstein 1989,
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appendix B) . These functions are the profit function of the incumbent
against one competitor, 7r'2, the profit function of the challenger if he is
the only challenger to bid in competition with the incumbent, 7r''2 , and the
profit function of the second challenger if he challenges the first
challenger when the incumbent does not bid, tt'^S.
t
The resulting model gene:falizes beyond the dichotomous structure
implicit in the probit outlined above. Whether an incumbent bids or not is
endogenous. If an incumbent bids (i.e. 7r'2 > 0), competition occurs when a
challenger can profitably bid against the incumbent (i.e. 7r'^2 >0).^'
Otherwise, only the incumbent bids (i.e. 7r'2 > 0, 7r'^2 < 0) . If the
incumbent does not bid (i.e. 7r'2 < 0), then competition occurs depending on
whether or not a second non-incumbent can profitably bid (i.e. competition:
n^5 > 0; only challenger: it^5 < 0). Generalizing to situations in which
there are no incumbents is straightforward. Competition depends solely on
the profitability of a challenger bidding against a challenger (i.e. n^B) .
The important result is that there is a correspondence between the
signs of the expected profit functions (shown in Figure 3) and outcomes
(represented in Figures 1 and 2). To summarize the behavioral model:
A single incumbent bids (SI)
An incumbent and challenger bid (CI or CC)
A single challenger bids (SC)
Two challengers, no incumbent, bid (CC)
IFF 7r'2 > 0, 7r'^2 <
IF 77-'2 > 0, ir'^2 >
IFF 7r'2 < 0, TT^S <
IF 7r'2 < 0, 7r'^5 >
This behavioral model determines the structure of the econometric model,
which is developed in the next section.
V Econometric Model
The expected profit functions are never observed directly. I
hypothesize that they are functions of the extent of substitutes available,
characteristics of the incumbents and challengers, and a function of
incumbent advantages and challenger disadvantages. Call these Zj, Wj , and
Xj, respectively, for observation i. I assume the profit functions for the
I
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ith system acquisition take the form:
(2) 7r'2
k'2
n'5
= f (W,-,X
= f!(w,.,x
= r(w,,x
,Z
,Z
,Z
) - el,
) - £2,
) - e5,
where f\ f^, and f are measures of deterministic part of the vendor's
expected profit functions for a set of W,. , X,- , and Zj.
Economic reasoning will later impose restrictions on the set of
admissible W^ , X,. , and Zj in f\ f^, and f^. el, e2, and e5 represent the
measurement errors from measuring these functions incompletely. These
error terms are assumed to have a mean of zero and standard deviation equal
to al, a2 , and a5, respectively. Henceforth, the i subscripts will be
dropped for convenience. It follows from equation (2) that
(3) 7r'2 > if and only if f^(W,X,Z) > el, and
7r'^2 > if and only if f^(W,X,Z) > e2, and
n-'^S > if and only if f^(W,X,Z) > e5.
If distribution assumptions are placed over the errors, then f , f , and f
become indexes of the probability that incumbents and challengers bid. In
other words, the probability that a certain outcome occurred can be
rewritten as the probability that incumbent and challenger bidders bid in a
manner that produced that outcome. In other words, using the equation (3)
and the behavioral model outlined in the previous section, the probability
for each possible outcome becomes:
P(SI) = [ P(f^ > el, f^ < e2) ] ,
P(SC) = [ P(f; < el, fl < €5) ],
P(CI, CC) = [ P(f^ > el, r > 62) + P(f^ < el, f' > e5) ] ,
P(SNI) = [ P(f^ < e5, conditional on no incumbents)],
P(CNI) = [ P(f^ > e5, conditional on no incumbents)],
where ?() represents the probability of each possible outcome, as labelled
in Figures 1 and 2, and P( • , • ) represents the joint probability that
two necessary actions were taken.
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There is a simple means of distinguishing between outcomes (CI) and
(CC) . The behavioral model shows that outcome (CI) only occurs if the i
incumbent bids, while outcome (CC) can occur if the incumbent bids and
loses or if the incumbent does not bid at all. To explicitly account for
the two different paths to the different outcomes, let
P(CI) = [ P(f^ > el, f^ > €2)*PP ], and
P(CC) = [ P(f^ > el, f^ > e2)*(l - PP) + P(f^ < el, f^ > e5) ],
where PP is the probability that the incumbent will both bid and win if he
profitably bids against one challenger. ^^
VI Specification of the Index Functions
This section specifies the functional form of equations f\ f^, and
f . The index for the bidding of the challenger against a challenger, f^,
is specified as follows:
(4) f^(W,Z) = 65 + Byc*^^ "^ Sz*2/
where WC and Z are COMPSYS, DEDAP, SIZE, NETWORK, and NOINCUMB, defined
below. There is no reason to expect an index of challenger behavior to be a
function of an incumbent's advantages, so no such measure is included.
The index for the bidding of a challenger against an incumbent, f^
should be a function of many of the same market segment variables as was
f
,
but at the same time also a function of challenger disadvantages, for
which I set parameters with the vector X. f^ is specified as follows:
(5) f^(W,Z,X) = 62 + 6'yi*WI + r*[6yc*WC + B^*^'^ +
^x*^'
where r > is some proportionality factor, and where 6^*X indexes the
effect of a challenger competing against an incumbent. X includes INVEST,
CAPACITY, EXPERIENCE, EXPERIENCE2 , and IBMINC and WI includes INCSYS, all
to be defined later. The factors in WC and Z are assumed to influence the
I
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index of challenger bidding against an incumbent in exactly the same
direction and with the same relative magnitudes as they influence
challenger bidding against another challenger. The proportionality factor
will not be recoverable, but shows how Z influences f^ relative to the
influence of Z in f^. The estimated value for 6^*^ should enter the profits
of the second entrant with a negative magnitude if challenger disadvantages
deter challenger bidding.
I assume that a disadvantage to a challenger has a proportional and
opposite advantage to an incumbent, f^ is specified as follows:
(6) fVw,Z,X) = Bl + 6y,*WI + 0*[6'yj.*WC + R^*7, - R^*X] ,
where > is another proportionality factor and WI includes INCSYS.
Though will not be recoverable, it indicates that the relative importance
of Z and X in f^ relative to their importance for f and f .
The estimation will yield coefficients to equations whose errors have
been normalized to a standard normal. This is accomplished by dividing each
equation by the standard deviation of the errors. Hence, equations (4),
(5) , and (6) become
(7) f^'(W,Z) = [US + Byc*WC + B,*Z]/a5,
:1
(8) f'''(W,Z,X) = [B2 + r*(B'y,*WI + By(,*WC + R^*Z) + B^*X]/a2,
(9) f^'(W,Z,X) = [Bl + By,*WI + 0*(B'y(,*WC + B^*^ " B^*X)]/al,
where the errors are now /j1 = el/al, ^2 = e2/a2, and ^5 = e5/a5, which are
all standard normal variables with mean zero and variance equal to one,
under the assumption that el, e2, and eS are distributed normally.
Equations (7), (8), and (9) imply that the functional forms for f ^ ' ,
f^'
, and f^' will be:
(10) f^'(w,z) = 95 + ey(,*wc + e^*z,
(11) f^'(w,z,x) = 62 + [eyt.*wc + e'y,*wi + e^*z]*6 + e^*yi, and
(12) f^'(W,Z,X) = 61 + 6y,*WI + [(6'y;.*WC + e^*z)*s - e^*X]*a,
14
where 05 = 65/a5, 92 = B2/a2, 61 = Bl/al, e^^ = By^/aS, 6^ = B^/aS, 9^ =
B)(/a2, 9y, = By,/al, and <S = (r*a5)/a2, and a = (0*a2)/al. Clearly 5 and a
must be positive.
t
To make initial estimation more tractable, I will also assume that el
and e2 are uncorrelated, and el and e5 are uncorrelated. This specification
can accommodate arbitrary correlation between e2 and e5, which is subsumed
in the specification of S. The net results is a redefinition of the
probability of each event. That is:
P(SI) = [ i{f]
P(SC) = [ *(f^
p(ci) = [ *(f;
P(CC) = [ *(f^
P(SNI) = [ *(f^
P(CNI) = [ *(f'
> Ail)**(fJ' < M2) ],
< Ml)**(f,' < M5) ],
> Ml)**(f ' > m2)**(PPP) ],
> Ml)**(f^' > m2)**(-PPP) )+*(f^' < Ml)**(f^' > M5) ]
< m5) ] , and
> M5)],
where $ is a cumulative standard normal function, (10) , (11) and (12)
define f ^ ' , f^ ' , and f ^ • , and PP = *(PPP), where PPP is a constant. That is,
the probability that an incumbent wins and bids under competition is a
coin-flip.^'^
Using these definitions, the loglikelihood for the competitiveness of
an acquisition can then be written as
LL = YSI*log[P(SI) ] + YSC*log[P(SC) ] +
YCI*log[P(CI) ] + YCC*log[P(CC) ] +
YSNI*log[P(SNI) ] + YCNI*log[P(CNI) ]
,
where six mutually exclusive indicator variables corresponding to outcomes
in Figures 1 and 2. These are:
YSI = 1
YSC = 1
YCI = 1
YCC = 1
SNI = 1
CNI = 1
if sole-sourcing with the incumbent is observed;
if sole-sourcing with the challenger is observed;
if the incumbent vendor is chosen in a competitive bid;
if a challenger vendor is chosen in a competitive bid;
if a single supplier is observed when there is no incumbent ;V
if competition is observed when there is no incumbent.
(
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In sum, this log-likelihood estimates 65, 92, 61, 6^^, ey, , 9^, 65^, 6
and a. The estimates will indicate the signs of 6y^, 6y[ , R^, and &^, but
never their magnitudes, except relative to a variance. The proportionality
factors in (5) and (6) , and r, are not identified except relative to
estimates of the proportional difference of each equation's variance.
VII Exogenous Variables
This section lists the data used for W, X, and Z. A summary of the
variables and their predicted sign in the market model is included in Table
1.^* A table of the means, standard deviations, minima, maxima, and
selected correlations is included in Table 2. The data appendix includes
more detail.
Via. Characteristics of challengers and incumbents
Measures of the ease with which firms could bid in the short run were
constructed. These are divided between those for competitors and those for
incumbents. These counts are called WC and WI , respectively.
NiiiLber of competitor's systems (COMPSYS) . The number of systems offered by
non-incumbents in the market segment of the purchase was assigned to each
observation.^^ It is called COMPSYS and is included in f^ and f^ as WC. In
principle, it could also be included in f\ since it should influence the
value of the incumbent's expected profits.
Number of systems offered by the incumbent (INCUMBSYS) . In f^ is included a
count of the number systems offered by the incumbent in this market
segment. This represents WI . In any year, in a particular market segment,
an incumbent supplier is more likely to bid profitably, depending on the
number alternatives he can offer a buyer quickly. In principle, WI could
also be included in f^, since it should influence a non-incumbent's
expected profits.
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VII b. Characteristics of the requested system
The following variables, labelled as Z, index whether an incumbent or
challenger found it more profitable to bid on the type of system requested
{
Dedicated application (DEDAP) . Some dedicated applications were so
specialized that only a few suppliers might provide alternatives. Even when
accounting for the number of potential suppliers in a market segment,
acquiring a system for a dedicated application should decrease the
probability, on average, of eliciting much bidding.
The value of the procurement (SIZE) . Bidding is costly for suppliers
because potential vendors must assemble related equipment, pass benchmarks,
and prepare related documents. Some observers have expressed concern that
these costs are so high that they deter firms from bidding [See GAO (1981),
or the Grace Commission (1983)]. If the fixed costs of bidding deter
vendors from bidding and firms face different fixed costs, then the larger
the value of the procurement, the more likely that more vendors will bid.
The likelihood that success in one sale influences another (NETWORK)
.
Measuring the number of acquisitions at related sites should measure, to
some extent, how vendor bidding at one site influenced acquisitions at
related sites. ^^ It may show that an agency is making many purchases in a
particular year and that vendors are bidding aggressively with one office
to gain advantages with another.
Competition when there is no incvimbent (NOINCUMBENT) . The absence of an
incumbent may indicate something to bidders. This variable only appears in
f^ and only in 26 cases.
VIb The Advantages of incumbency and disadvantages to challengers
An incumbent's advantage is not directly observed. However, a buyer's
previous investment with a vendor is a plausible and useful proxy of an I
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incumbent's advantage for two reasons: First, a buyer tends to invest more
extensively in a vendor he prefers — the greater the previous purchases,
the more likely the incumbent vendor has a system that suits the buyer's
needs; Second, irrespective of which vendor best suits a buyer's needs, the
greater a user's commitment to an existing stock of equipment, the more
potential difficulty the user faces when replacing old equipment with new
equipment from a producer of incompatible equipment. Call a vector
measuring previous investment X- . If [Xj - X-] measures the relative
advantage of incumbent i over challenger j , then X,- is the only information
needed for measuring an incumbent's advantage at single incumbent sites
since X- is zero for all non-incumbents.
The final specification of f^ and f^ will include the following five
variables as X:
Previous investment with a supplier's equipment (INVEST). This variable
takes on the recorded dollar value of the owned equipment on site, adjusted
for changing producer prices. This should proxy for the value of switching
costs embedded in equipment, which most studies indicate can be quite
important.
Years experience with a supplier (EXPERIENCE and EXPERIENCE^) . This
variable measures the experience a user has with a supplier. It equals the
average age of systems a buyer possesses. Since there are only a few
systems at most sites, this variable usually equals the age of the system.
A squared term was included to test whether the value of experience with a
supplier depreciates rapidly after systems become especially old.
Total Computing Capacity (CAPACITY) . The total number of commercially
available, general purpose systems on site weighted by the average system
size approximates the total computing capacity on site. The larger the
capacity of the site, the greater the investment in system and applications
software, and the less flexibility when buying replacements. Note that this
measure is highly correlated with the total number of systems on site
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(approx 0.9).
IBM is an incximbent (IBMINC) . This variable takes on the value 1 when IBM ^
is the incumbent system vendor at a site. It measures whether IBM seems to
be at a disadvantage.^^ The disadvantage to IBM could stem either from the
selective enforcement of procurement rules or from the increased entry in
the 1970s of competitors to IBM.
VIII Estimation Results
Table 3 contains estimates for the log-likelihood function using
equations (10), (11), and (12). In these estimates G\^ and Q\c were
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constrained to zero. Since the estimates in Table 3 are difficult to
fully comprehend without a lot of experience with these types of models, a
useful alternative exposition is shown in Tables 4 and 5. These contain
simulations using the estimates. Table 4 shows the derivatives of the
predicted probabilities with respect to the exogenous variables. Table 5
shows the consequences for the predicted probabilities from changing a
continuous variable by one standard deviation, while setting all other
continuous variables at their mean value. Table 5 also gives changes in
probabilities resulting from turning the dummy variables on and off. The
discussion below will concentrate on Tables 4 and 5. The first two sub-
sections describe the results and the next section interprets them.
Vila The relative ranking of influences
Characteristics of the market segment of the purchase. DEDAP, NETWORK,
and SIZE are all of the expected sign and reasonable magnitudes. Tables 4
and 5 show that a one unit increase in the SIZE has the same effect as a
2.3 increase in the number of systems acquired by related offices (NETWORK)
or a one-system increase in the number of systems available to an incumbent
(INCSYS)
.
On net, a one-standard-deviation in NETWORK had more to do with
shifting the probability of observing competition than any other continuouJ
variable. The probability of observing competition increased by 0.07 when '
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IBM was an incumbent and by 0.16 when IBM was not. Those shifts are
complemented by responses to changes in SIZE. A one-standard-deviation in
size increases the probability of observing competition by 0.10 when IBM is
not an incumbent and by 0.48 when it is not. The absolute magnitude of both
of these shifts exceeds the shifts from any other category of variable
overall. Turning DEDAP on or off decreases the probability of IBM bidding
by .11, but of a non-IBM incumbent by .02. It decreases the probabilities
of challengers to IBM by .04 and to a non-IBM challenger by .10. DEDAP can
shift the probabilities, but this dummy could often be easily swamped by
other factors.
The availability of alternatives. For the estimates in Tables 4 and 5,
INCSYS says that the addition of one more system to the list of an
incumbent's offerings in a size class shifts the index that an incumbent
will bid by .36. The addition of one more system to the list of all non-
incumbent's offerings in a size class (COMPSYS) shifts the index that a
challenger will bid against a challenger by .011 and against an incumbent
by .044. On net, when IBM is not an incumbent, a standard deviation in
COMPSYS decreases the probability of observing sole-sourcing by .11. When
IBM is an incumbent, then INCSYS influences the probability of IBM winning
a competitive bid by .09, which is the second strongest predictor of
success in competition.
Are these numbers small or large? A one-standard-deviation increase in
COMPSYS, or 10 more systems in a market segment (or just over two firms on
average), increases the probability of competition by .11. This seems to be
a large amount relative to the high percentage of acquisitions that were
already competitive — i.e., it is surprising that potential competition
had any effect at all. This seems to be a small amount relative to the
expense of entry into this market. Other factors, which are not as socially
expensive as entry, produce just as big an effect.
An incumbent's advantages and a challenger's disadvantages.
EXPERIENCE, EXPERIENCE^, and INVEST are of the expected sign and reasonable
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magnitudes. CAPACITY'S effect is the opposite of expectations, but very
small. The INVEST variable says that each $100,000 of investment (1967 (
dollars) decreases the index that a challenger will bid against an
incumbent by .011, and that an incumbent will bid against a challenger by
.013. Since this variable averages 12 ($100,000 units) with a standard
deviation of 27, its effect is not especially large until it reaches its
upper ranges (25.3 million dollars maximum), when its effect is quite
large. A one standard deviation increase in INVEST increases the
probability of sole-sourcing with the incumbent by 0.10 when IBM is not the
incumbent and 0.04 when IBM is incumbent. EXPERIENCE can never match this
magnitude of impact. The maximum impact occurs when EXPERIENCE = 3.75, with
a total decrease of the index of the challenger bidding against the
incumbent of .39. Moreover, the effect of EXPERIENCE reverses in sign for
sites where the average age of systems is greater than 7.5. Thus,
EXPERIENCE does not seem to have a large impact. CAPACITY must exceed its
range to really have a large impact. I have found that these qualitative
results are insensitive to including or excluding different measures of an
incumbent's advantage.
On net, INVEST is the strongest indicator of an incumbent's
advantage. I suspect that INVEST measures the occasional sites that have
extensive investments in miscellaneous equipment. However, for most of the
sample INVEST never swamps the effect of other variables. Moreover,
EXPERIENCE and CAPACITY do not have strong effects. Finally, other
calculations show that in only 54 percent of the cases in the sample do the
challenger disadvantages subtract on net from the index of the probability
of a challenger bidding against an incumbent.^' Thus, while these measures
of an incumbent's advantages can be important in predicting diminishing
competition, for a large number of cases in this sample, other factors
dominate.
The IBM incumbency variable, which is on for 40 percent of the sites,
is the most important of the dummy variables. Table 7 shows that the IBM
variable changes the probability that a challenger will bid by .17 and thaI
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an incumbent (IBM) will bid by .13, a relative change that few variables
will match, except at extreme values. When IBM is the incumbent, the
probability of competition increases by .14. This again demonstrates the
uniqueness of federal offices where IBM is an incumbent supplier relative
to offices where IBM is not an incumbent (See Greenstein 1990)
.
The probability of winning. Table 3 contains an estimate of the
probability of the incumbent bidding and winning if the incumbent can
profitably bid against a single challenger. The estimate of PPP = .61
translates into a probability of .729 of bidding and winning. ^° This point
estimate says that of the 52 cases where a challenger won a competitive
procurement, approximately 40 (or 76 percent of the total) were competition
between incuitibent and challenger. The other 12 were competition between
challenger and challenger, as when an incumbent refused to bid against a
number of challengers.
These results show that competitive procurement favored incumbents on
average 3 to 1, but did not lock out all challengers, at least not in this
sample. And while incumbents did not bid on every procurement, they did bid
on most. The previously mentioned estimates indicate that incumbent
suppliers did not bid on approximately 11 percent of all procurement, which
resulted in 22 acquisitions automatically going to challengers (10 sole-
sourced with non-incumbents plus the 12 competitive ones estimated from
above)
.
Vllb Developing an overall interpretation
Tables 3, 4, and 5 reveal that the market processes underlying the
outcomes are much more complex than any estimates of a probit could
represent.
The overall importance of the size of the procurement (SIZE) and the
number of acquisitions occurring at related sites (NETWORK) provides
evidence that procurement with a high dollar value drew more competitors.
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This is consistent with the view that the fixed costs of bidding can be
substantial enough to influence bidding behavior. ^^ i
The estimates of the effects of supply (INCSYS, COMPSYS) point toward
the role of differences in the potential supply across market segments and
time. At the very least, this is evidence that all mainframe market
segments were not uniformly competitive in the sample period and that the
competitiveness of acquisitions was a function of the potential supply
prevailing in the private market.
Of the measures of an incumbent's advantages, dollar investment
(INVEST) , but not experience or capacity, is the best predictor of sole-
sourcing with an incumbent. Yet, by no means does dollar investment
dominate the other variables. The single most important variable for
predicting the competitiveness of procurement was whether IBM was an
incumbent at a site or not. If this is solely the result of market factors,
then it may be measuring potential competition that is missed by the other
measures — that is, previous users of IBM tend to be in market segments
where there is relatively more competition than other sectors of the
mainframe market.
The foregoing interpretation is remarkable when compared with other
results (Greenstein 1990) showing that an agency's previous experience with
an incumbent predicts choosing that incumbent again. When an IBM360/370 is
on site, IBM appears to receive the "same advantage" from its incumbency as
other firms receive from incumbency. The two results together say that even
though IBM is in more competitive market segments, incumbency still
provides the same advantage to IBM.^^
The above interpretation draws a clearer picture of the economic
factors underlying commercial mainframe market for federal agencies: the
competitiveness of acquisitions differs from case to case, depending,
first, on the value of the procurement at the office and related offices;
second, on the potential supply of alternatives in the relevant market <
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segment at the time of the acquisition; and third, to a lesser extent on
the buyer's relationship with his incuinbent vendor, particularly if that
vendor is IBM or if the buyer has made extensive investments with an
incumbent.
VIIc Supervision and inferences from the estimates
Do these estimates tell us something about the commercial mainframe
computer market in the time period studied?^^ To what extent is oversight
systematically altering the magnitude of the estimates?
It is well-known that GSA follows guidelines that resulted in it more
closely scrutinizing more valuable procurement. It is possible that systems
of larger size would tend to be more competitive if the GSA approved of
sole-sourcing less frequently when it supervised large systems. The open
issue concerns whether oversight could turn acquisitions that agencies
would otherwise sole-source into competitive acquisitions. Oversight could
ostensibly produce more competitive procurement (at least on paper) if, as
some observers have stated, the satisfaction of procedural requirements for
competition became ends in the themselves, irrespective of the impact on
economic efficiency of the outcome.''^
This interpretation has consequences for recommendations from these
measurements. If fixed costs were solely responsible for the result that
more valuable procurement was more competitive, then this study would
recommend that agencies bundle purchases together to get more competitive
procurement. If supervision accounted, in part, for the outcome, then
agencies may have had incentives to separate acquisitions in order to avoid
supervision.
Supervision may also explain in part why an incumbent's advantages did
not much influence the results in this sample — even though several
departures from cost minimization in federal agency's behavior should favor
incumbents more than in an ideal profit-maximizing private firm. In
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particular, strict GSA competitive procedures were thought to be more price
sensitive than those of an agency would be, and to weigh less the "soft
numbers," such as the expected benefits from future system support,
servicing reliability (GAO 1981) .=»nd software-conversion expenses. ^^ This
difference in the weighing of factors could have induced more bidding from
non-incumbent suppliers by diminishing the agency's ability to manipulate
vendor selection, no matter how much experience the vendor had with the
agency.
The performance of IBM in this sample also could represent some
factors unique to the government and not shared by private buyers. Though
Congressman Brooks retained no formal veto, it was widely believed that he
closely monitored the GSA's actions from his position on the House
Government Operations Committee (Petrillo 1982), interfering with a
procurement when he pleased (e.g. slowed down approval, held up funding).
Kelman (1990, pg. 8) states that the worry that the lack of competition
favored IBM motivated Congressman Brooks to push for more competition in
computer procurement. Werling's (1983) thesis on the implementation of the
Brooks Act argued that this intervention did, in fact, slant oversight
against IBM.''* The above results could be made consistent with Werling's
thesis in the following sense: If an agency was predisposed to purchase IBM
it had to use competitive procedures with greater frequency than if it was
predisposed to one of IBM's competitors.
VIII SvuTunary
The discussion in this paper analyzed how market forces influenced the
competitiveness of computer system procurement in the federal government.
It concentrated on measuring the influence of an incumbent's advantage on
outcomes. It developed an econometric model of procurement, in which the
unobserved bidding behavior of incumbent and challenger vendors shaped the
econometric structure. The method distinguished between different
influences of an incumbent's advantage on sole-sourcing with an incumbent
and with an non-incumbent. The empirical method also recovered informatioI
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about the (implicit) unobserved decision of bidders. The model was
estimated on a sample of federal computer system acquisitions in the 1970s
and early 1980s.
The estimation revealed that at least several economic factors
determined the competitiveness of procurement. As expected, the extent of
experience a buyer has had with a vendor could have influenced the
likelihood of sole-sourcing with that incumbent. However, in many cases
other market factors dominated. The extent of possible substitutes in
different segments of the mainframe market influenced the competitiveness
of procurement across market segments. In addition, procurement of greater
value induced more bidding. The potential importance of several non-market
factors was also analyzed, particularly the effect of oversight on high
value procurement.
There was insufficient evidence to conclude whether the federal
experience with IBM reflected industry-wide trends or was unique to the
federal government. Evidence was consistent with the view that the market
for commercial mainframes for government use can be characterized either as
a market in which many competitors in the 1970s bid against IBM or a market
in which the federal procurement process placed IBM at special
disadvantages
.
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DATA APPENDIX
Characteristics of challengers and incximbents [
From 1976 to 1983, International Data Corporation (IDC) classified
general purpose computer systems into six categories according to market
size, each group composed of systems that largely substitute for one
another. These are designated by the numbers 2 through 7 in IDC's "General
Purpose" mainframe system surveys. For example, an IBM 1400 falls in the
size class 2, models 360/20 and 370/115 in size class 3, models 360/30, 40
and 44, and 370/125 and 135 in size 4, models 360/50 and 370/145 in size 5,
models 360/65 and 370/155 and 158 in size 6, and models 360/67, 75, 85, and
95, and 370/165, 168, and 195 in size 7.
From each IDC survey I counted in each size category the total number
of systems offered by each vendor (The 1976 counts were applied to
observations from earlier years) . This captures two related notions about
potential supply in a market. First, a larger number of vendors per size
category should indicate a greater probability that one vendor will possess
a viable option and, hence, will bid. Second, irrespective of the number of
vendors, a larger number of systems offered by challengers should indicate
how easily vendors found alternatives to offer as a bid, and a greater
probability of more than one vendor bidding -- this holds whether the bid
is made by the system manufacturer or value-added vendor that repackages a
manufacturer's equipment. In this market the number of systems offered
correlates highly with the number of system suppliers in a market segment
(approx .8 at a 9 to 2 ratio). Note that using these variables limits the
sample to commercial mainframes. Minicomputers — even those that perform
mainframe-like applications, such as DEC's VAX — are excluded from the IDC
grouping.
Constructing WI and WC is straightforward except for acquisitions of
systems at sites where General Electric (GE) or RCA were incumbent system
suppliers. Just prior to the beginning of the sample period, these
companies were acquired by Honeywell and Sperry-Univac, respectively. It
seems improper to treat GE as separate from Honeywell (and RCA from Sperry-
Univac)
,
since the sales operations were merged. It also seems improper to
assign to all GE sites the advantages possessed by former Honeywell sites,
since the product lines were not designed to be well integrated. Due to
this problem, I estimated each equation with three different codings: (1)
as if the merged firms had totally integrated product lines; (2) as if they
never merged; and (3) I simply excluded all 11 sites at which GE or RCA
were incumbents, which were the only cases where the issue was relevant.
Note that (1) and (2) will also differ in their definition of who was an
incumbent and who was not. For example, moving from GE to Honeywell is
counted as choice of an incumbent under (1), but not (2). This influenced
the coding of 5 of the 11 observations at which GE or RCA were incumbents
As it turned out, the 3 sets of estimates did not differ sharply
(Greenstein 1989, Appendix B)
.
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Characteristics of requested system
Dedicated application (DEDAP) . The government's inventory classifies
systems by their application. Dedicated applications include process
control and other monitoring applications that could employ standard
mainframe equipment (Most special government designs and other customized
systems have been eliminated from the sample) . This is different from a
general management system, the class of systems making up most of the
sample, where the hardware is used as a "platform" for a variety of ever-
changing programming.
The value of the procurement (SIZE) . There is no direct measure of a
system's value, since delivery of systems is not always taken at once. The
best proxy for the value of a system is the size of the system requested.
SIZE is superior to the recorded price of the main CPU. Further efforts are
needed to understand how recorded prices were allocated between all the
components that come bundled together in a system.
The likelihood that success in one sale influences another (NETWORK) : There
is no direct measure of whether bidding at one agency's office influences
bidding for another office's purchases. However, the acquisition history of
similar offices in an agency contains related information. This variable
equals the number of system acquisitions made by other offices within the
same "office command bureau" in the same year as the office making the
observed purchase. For the smaller civilian agencies, this variable simply
equals the number of other systems acquired by the entire agency. In the
larger federal agencies, particularly the Army, Navy, and Air Force,
offices are typically divided into command bureaus by region (Overseas,
West Coast, Southeast, etc.) and, less often, by function (research
division, accounting division, etc.), and sometimes both. Despite the
looseness of this definition over time and across agencies, it seemed more
sensible to count the number of system acquisitions in an office command
bureau, rather than an agency. Counting agency acquisitions in practice
would be virtually equivalent to a dummy variable for defence agency or
not, since defense agencies have much larger yearly budgets allocated to
computer systems than do civilian agencies. But such a dummy does not
measure the interrelationship between offices we are looking for.
Competition when there is no incximbent (NOINCUMBENT) . This dummy variable
is one when there is no incumbent and zero otherwise.
Incumbency advantages and challenger disadvantages
Previous investment in a supplier's equipment (INVEST). This variable takes
on the recorded dollar value of the owned equipment on site, adjusted for
changing producer prices.
Years experience with a supplier (EXPERIENCE and EXPERIENCE^) . This
variable equals the average age of systems a buyer possesses. Since there
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are only a few systems at most sites, this variable usually equals the age
of the system.
g
Total computing capacity (CAPACITY) : The total number of commercially '
available general purpose systems on site weighted by the average system
size approximates the total computing capacity on site. (Size is determined
by the IDC measure) . Note that this measure is highly correlated with the
total number of systems on site (approx 0.9). The total number of systems
and the total number of commercial systems is the same at most
installations in the sample except at a few military and Department of
Energy sites.
IBM is an incvunbent (IBMINC) : This variable takes on the value 1 when IBM
is the incumbent system vendor at a site. Approximately 4 percent of all
acquisitions occurring at single-incumbent sites had IBM as an incumbent,
and the overwhelming majority of these sites had a system from the IBM
360/370 family on site (86 percent)
.
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ENDNOTES
1. Recent contributions to understanding government procurement
or auctions in practice includes Hendricks, Porter, and Boudreau
(1987) , and Hendricks and Porter (1988) on asymmetric information
in oil lease auctions, Lichtenberg (1988) on Research and
Development and government procurement, Crocker (1990) on Air
Force engine procurement, Rogerson (1990a, b, c) on defense
procurement of weapons, and Greenstein (1990) on mainframe
computer vendor choice.
2. This model is based on the framework outlined in Go for 12; An
Interim Report of the Elimination of Unnecessary Bottlenecks in
the Acquisition Process , Appendix B (GSA 1987) . Also see Grace
Commission (1983), report on ADP/Office Automation, page 34, for
"ideal" computer procurement procedures. Of course, reality is
more complex. Kelman (1990), chapters 2 and 3, provides a
detailed description and analysis of problems in the use of these
procedures.
3. Kelman (1990), pg. 22, states that in a 1989 survey of federal
computer procurement managers, one-third of the recently awarded
contracts had been protested.
4. For example, see GAO 1983 on benchmarking practices and their
abuse. The Government Accounting Office would not speculate on
how widespread abuse was. Kelman (1990), chapters 2 and 3,
provide details on the subtle ways in which an agency may and may
not "hard wire" a contract. Allegations of manipulation of
specifications have recently come to light in the national press.
For allegations that the Navy systematically favors IBM, see
Washington Post, 1-8-89, HI, and the New York Times, 12-9-88,
page CI. Thanks to Jonathan Baker, Luis Cabral, and Greg Rosston
for bringing these to my attention.
5. 1983 was the final year that the inventories recorded the
procurement code. I would like to thank Professor Frank Fisher,
IBM Corporation, and Martha Gray of the National Bureau of
Standards for their aid locating what appears to be the last
existing copy of these inventories. For summaries of individual
years, see NBS 1977, 1978, & 1982, or GSA's ADP Activity Summary
or ADPE Inventory summaries from various years.
6. Over 3 billion dollars was spent on "General Purpose Automatic
Data Processing Equipment, Suppliers and Support" in 1986. See
GSA 1987, page 15. In the IDC General Purpose Surveys, Federal
computer sites never comprised more than 3 percent of the sample
in any year (12/8/75, 12/5/78) , indicating that Federal offices
are one of many buyers in the U.S domestic market. Uses for
mainframes include simple repetitive calculations that use large
data-bases, and a limited amount of process control. See NBS
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(1981), chapter 4, for some evidence that federal mainframe use
resemlDles that of its private-industry counterparts.
7. An office is literally called an "ADP Unit" in the inventory.
Offices within agencies tended to be differentiated by geography
and sometimes by function. There is little evidence that
physically linked offices were counted twice.
8. The records also do not reveal how sole-sourcing and
competition were defined, leaving it to the acquiring agency to
decide. The definition in this text is the most common definition
used by government personnel. Differences in reporting
definitions or procedures across agencies has never come to my
attention. The Navy and Army codes do not indicate how
competitive were acquisitions in the 1983 inventory.
9. The incumbent vendor in this data set is the vendor that
designed the system used by the site in the previous year.
10. The sample eliminates very large sites. There is no
indication that this procedure greatly biased the sample towards
any manufacturer, system or buyer. If anything, it may be that
more "scientific" work tended to be done at very large sites,
which might bias the sample of acquisitions in this paper towards
standard administrative applications such as inventory and
payroll
.
11. The rule for deciding between vendors need not be fully
specified when the procedural choice is made. I need only assume
that at the start of phase (2) all buyers have a partially
uncertain decision rule for deciding between alternatives in
phase (3) . This source of uncertainty in decision-making is
plausitDle since procurement procedures introduce volatility into
decision making, and when bids are first solicited, buyers may
not know precisely what they want their future system to do, and
buyers may only vaguely know how to evaluate the alternatives.
Logically there must be some uncertainty in bidding: In a world
in which there are fixed costs of bidding, if there were no
uncertainty two suppliers would never compete against one
another, because all the future winners of every procurement
could be anticipated; and no seller would incur the expenses of
preparing for a procurement that he would surely not win.
12. This is a reasonable concern. See GAO 1977b or GAO 1980 on
the influence of conversion expenses on the selection of new
vendors, and Kelman (1990), pg. 70 -73, on the sources of an
incumbent's advantage in procurement. Economic theorists have
also been interested in how "switching costs" could alter
competitive behavior. See Farrell (1987), Farrell and Shapiro
(1986) and (1987), and Klemperer (1986) mathematical models, or
Williamson (1975) and (1979) for a wider discussion of the causes
and consequences of investment in relation-specific assets. For
I
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theoretical work on switching costs in procurement, see McAfee
and McMillan (1986) for a general framework, or Anton and Yao
(1988), Demski, Sappington, and Spiller (1988), or Cabral and
Greenstein (1990) for analyses of supplier switching.
13. It is also widely believed that agencies favor those vendors
that require the least use of the agency's discretionary budget.
An agency may simply favor the vendor whose product
inconveniences their workers the least — for example, if a
system requires the least retraining or other adjustment costs.
These incentives can also work to the advantage of incumbent
system supplier.
14. There may have been a computer on site, but none of the
potential mainframe system vendors in the sample provided a
system.
15. In practice, a formal request typically elicits 2 or 3 formal
bids and occasionally more, though more informal interest is not
uncommon.
16. The sequential move game has an advantage over a
simultaneous-move game for the application here in that it avoids
any indeterminant solutions to the question of which of many
players will be the sole bidder when it is profitable for only
one player to bid. See Bresnahan and Reiss (1987) for elaboration
on the point. In addition, simultaneous-move games in the context
of bidding models require more explicit, perhaps arbitrary,
specification of the exit and entry rules of bidders. This is a
topic for further research.
17. Notice that the fourth assumption partially overlaps with the
third assumption. It rules out some games in which asymmetric
knowledge between incumbent and non-incumbent about the
profitability of bidding is partially revealed by an incumbent's
decision to bid or not to bid.
18. One interpretation of this assumption is that it imposes the
constraint that the probability of winning a bid is quite high
for the incumbent against the weak challenger. Hence, the
expected revenues of the incumbent as a sole bidder and in
competition with the weak challenger are greater than the
expenses of putting together the bid. Alternatively, one could
make tt'i, it^2
, and 7r'"5 sufficient for predicting all outcomes by
assuming that tt'i > 0, and 7r"^2 > implies either 7r'2 > or 7r'"5 >
0. See Greenstein (1989), Appendix A, for a discussion of this
and alternative assumptions.
19. The incumbent may not eventually bid if a multiple number of
challengers makes it unprofitable for the incumbent to do so.
Even though an incumbent may be profitable against one challenger
by assumption (i.e. 7r'2 > 0), profitability against a multiple
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number of challengers is not guaranteed. Thus, either the
incumbent or challenger could win in competition with one
another, or the incumbent may not bid at all.
20. There is no error attributed to the "false expectations" of
an agency. Any systematic mis-estimation of an incumbent's or
non-incumbent ' s propensity to bid will be measured in the
constant of the index of that player's behavior.
21. PP indexes the joint probability of bidding and winning. The
incumbent will bid if there is only one challenger, but he may
not have bid if multiple challengers made it unprofitable.
22. Notice that an alternative for equation (6) could be
(6') f^(W,Z,X) = 51 + Bui*WI + 0*[6'y^*WC + &^*Z] - n[\*X] ,
where n > and > are different factors of proportionality.
This implies a slightly altered estimation equation than the one
reported here. Tests of this second alternative specification
contributed very little to the likelihood function. Hence, the
simpler specification is used. See Greenstein (1989).
23. While it is possible to paramaterize the probability that an
incumbent will win a competitive bid as a function of observable
characteristics of the site, I have found with this sample of
acquisitions, that the estimates of the other parameters do not
change much as a consequence. Since the method's purpose is to
predict the probability of using competition versus sole-
sourcing, rather than predict which vendor wins a competitive
bid, it seemed best to use the simplest possible specification.
24. Several other variables were also tried in earlier
specifications, but found to be less informative. This included
measures of the technical age of the system acquired, and
indicators of whether the acquired system was multi-processor,
and whether is was acquired by a Department of Defence subagency
such as the Army, Air Force, or Navy. Year of acquisition was
also found to be uninformative when added to a specification in
which SYSTEMS was included, but significant when SYSTEMS was
excluded. However, the specification with only SYSTEMS had a
higher likelihood and a more ready structural interpretation.
Hence, the remaining variables comprise a minimal list.
25. This assumes that exogeneity of the market segment will be
warranted by the breadth of the IDC segments and the government
system labels employed.
26. There are frequent complaints from the period about the
inability of offices to share software, so the probability that
all of an agency's office's decisions are linked by strong
network externalities is somewhat in doubt. Yet, one might still
expect some correlation if multiple sites perform similar
functions and acquire similar systems simultaneously in an effort
33
to standardize their information processing and learn from each
other's experiences. Hence, vendors may anticipate that success
in one location will influence their success elsewhere.
27. P. R. Werling (1983), who wrote a thesis on the
administration of the Brooks Act, argued that the oversight
especially favored vendors other than IBM and that IBM
procurement was more closely monitored, especially in an non-
competitive procurement (see Werling, page 177, 262 and the
discussion). Yet, Werling's argument remains largely untested
because his quantitative evidence could be interpreted in many
ways (Greenstein 1989) . Kelman (1990) also asserts that the fear
that the lack of competition favored IBM motivated Brooks to push
for more competition, though he does not present any quantitative
evidence. In this sample, the measured characteristics of sites
that have IBM as an incumbent do not differ much from other
sites. Thus, there seemed to be little statistic justification
for interacting the dummy with other measures of an incumbent's
advantages.
28. It was found that a "rival's" potential did not contribute
significantly to the estimation. Using log ratio tests to test
the joint hypotheses e'y, = and e\^ = could not be rejected
at the 10 percent level.
29. This calculation was made by multiplying IBMINC, INVEST,
EXPERIENCE, EXPERIENCE^ and CAPACITY by their respective
coefficients and by adding up for each sample observation.
30. Measures of the extent of previous experience with the
incumbent were not statistically significant predictors of the
probability that an incumbent would win a competitive
procurement. The only significant results showed that IBM had a
slightly lower probability of winning than other firms, that the
Air Force stayed with its incumbents more often and that the Navy
switched more often. However, these specifications did not change
the others estimates much at all, so the predicted probability of
sole-sourcing versus competition also did not change. Since the
goal of the analysis was to predict choice of procedures rather
than the winner of competitive bids, it seemed best to report the
simpler specification.
31. The importance of fixed costs and the size of the procurement
may be overemphasized in federal procurement relative to private
industry. When the Government Accounting Office (GAO 1981)
compared private practices with federal procurement practices
they observed that computer vendors needed to meet more
requirements to qualify for bidding for federal agencies than did
those selling to private industry.
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32. However, unlike Greenstein's previous research, because only
12 of 88 sites did not contain a system from the IBM 360/370
family, we cannot distinguish between the differences at sites
who were using an older generation of equipment with limited
upward compatibility and those using a newer generation with
expanded upward compatibility.
33. For contrasting analyses of the market in this time period,
see Brock (1975) ; Fisher, McGowen and Greenwood (1983) ; and
Fisher, Mckie, and Mancke (1983)
.
34. As the Grace Commission (1983) states: "The Government's
(automatic data processing) acquisition process indicates
disproportionate concern with 'process accountability.'" When
Werling (1983) focuses on the implementation of the Brooks Act,
he strongly emphasizes how agencies could not understand the
logic behind oversight process. Kelman (1990) further argues that
agency procurement should be less much rule-bound, allowing them
to update technical specifications as they learn about a product
in the course of a bid. For an alternative view, see GAO 1977a or
House report 94-1746 (1976) for some complaints about the
inability of the Brooks Act to achieve its desired ends.
35. Until the beginning of the 1980s, GSA evaluation of
competitive bids were not systematically accounting for the short
and long-term costs of converting existing software to
incompatible vendors' systems (GAO 1980). For a summary of this
debate and an analysis of related economic issues, see Cabral and
Greenstein (1990) . For an in depth analysis of the way the
procurement institutions resolve the trade-off between prices and
quality, see Kelman (1990), chapter 2. On conversion costs, see
pages 103 -104.
36. Werling states (p. 262) , "Within the (automatic data
processing) community it has been common knowledge that the HGOC
(House Government Operations Committee) would delay procurement
for (automatic data processing equipment) ordered from IBM if at
all possible." Also see p. 177 and discussion. Greenstein (1990)
addresses the quantitative evidence using different methods.
Figure 1
Correspondence of Outcomes to ntunber of cases
Observe
Sole sourcing
Observe
Competition
When there is a single incumbent
Observe incumbent Observe challenger
winning winning
SI: Sole Source
Incumbent
26 cases
SC: Sole Source
Challenger
10 cases
CI: Incumbent wins
competition
107 cases
CC: Challenger wins
competition
52 cases
Observe
Sole sourcing
Observe
Competition
When there is no incumbent
Observe challenger
winning
SNI: Sole Source
Challenger
5 cases
CNI: Challenger wins
competition
21 cases
Note: 221 observations total
Figure 2
Incumbent'
s
Decision
Challenger's
Decision
Expected
Payoffs
Observed
Outcome
No Challenger bids
The Incumbent
bids
One Challenger bids
Two Challengers bid
[ tt'i , ] SI
[ 7r'2 , 7r'^2 ] CI or CC
[ tt's , tt'^3 ] CI or CC
No Challengers bid
The Incumbent
does not bid
Never observed
One Challenger bids
Two Challengers bid
[ , 7r'-4 ] SC
I , it's ] CC
Figure 3
Correspondence of profit functions to observed outcomes
SI. Only the incumbent bids (s ituation 1).
tt'i > 0, tt'^2 <
sc. Only a challenger bidIs, when there was an incumbent
(situation 4)
.
Tr'l <
tt'i >
0,
0, 7r'=2 >
0,
0,
or
n'5 < 0, 7r'2 < 0.
CI. Incumbent wins compet.ition between incumbent and challenger
(situation 2 or 3) .
tt'i > 0, 7r'^2 > 0, 7r^5 > 0, 7r'2 > 0, 7r^3 < or
tt'i > 0, n^2 > 0, 7r'2 > 0, 7r'^3 > 0, 7r'3 <
cc. Challenger wins competit ion between incumbent and challenger
or between challenger and challenger, when there was an
incumbent (si tuation 2
,
3 or 5) .
tt'i > 0, 7r'=2 > 0, tt'^S > 0, 7r'2 > 0, it'^3 < or
tt'i > 0, 7r'^2 > 0, 7r'2 > 0, tt'^B > 0, 7r'3 < or
tt'i <
tt'i >
0,
0, 7r'2 >
0,
0,
or
n'5 > 0, 7r'2 > 0, n'^3 > 7r'3 < 0, or
tt'i > 0, 7r^2 > 0, tt'-S > 0, 7r'2 < 0.
SNI . Challenger is sol e bidd er , no incumbent (situation 4) .
tt'^S < 0.
CNI . Challenger competes with another challenger, no incumbent
(situation 5) •
n's > 0.
Note: See figures 1 and 2 for numbering and lettering scheme.
Table 1
Covariates and the predicted sign of their coefficients
Abreviation Variable Definition Prediction
W; Characteristics of vendors
COMPSYS
INCSYS
Number of system offerred by challengers
Number of systems offerred by incumbent
Positive
Positive
Z: Characteristics of the market segment
SIZE
NETWORK
DEDAP
NOINCUMB
Size of system acquired (2 to 7)
Number of systems acquired at related site
System requested for dedicated application
No incumbent system supplier in prior year
Positive
Positive
Negative
None
X: Incumbent's advantages
IBMINC
INVESTMENT
EXPERIENCE
EXPERIENCE2
CAPACITY
IBM is an incumbent on site
Value of investment on site (1967 $100,000)
Average ages of site's systems
EXPERIENCE squared
Estimated computer capacity
Positive*
Negative*
Negative*
Positive*
Negative*
Positive: The sign of this coefficient expected to be positive.
Negative: The sign of this coefficient expected to be negative.
*: Expected sign in f 2 , the expected profitability of the entrant.
Table 2
Svunmary statistics for exogenous varieibles
ABREVIATION NOBS MEAN STD DEV MINIMUM MAXIMUM
SYSTEMS 221 39.34 10.16 20.00 74.00
COMPSYS 221 33.66 10.05 13.00 74.00
INCSYS 221 5.68 3.55 0.00 19.00
SIZE 221 4.85 1.35 2.00 7.00
NETWORK 221 4.98 6.23 1.00 34,00
DEDAP 221 0.12 0.32 0.00 1.00
NOINCUMB 221 0.12 0.32 0.00 1.00
IBMINC 221 0.39 0.49 0.00 1.00
INVESTMENT 221 12.17 27,53 0.00 253.00
EXPERIENCE 221 3.43 2.54 0.00 11.50
EXPERIENCE2 221 18.27 22.41 0.00 132.25
CAPACITY 221 10.88 20.70 0.00 118.87
Selected correlations
INVESTMENT
CAPACITY
IBMINC
AVEAGE
0.340
0.078
0.226
INVESTMENT
0.
0.
232
166
CAPACITY
-0.047
NETWORK
DEDAP
COMPSYS
INCSYS
INCSYS NETWORK DEDAP COMPSYS
-0.131
-0.268 0.056
-0.390 0.133 0.081
-0.055 0.097 0.006 -0. 098
Table 3
Estimates of equations (10), (11) & (12)
(Standard errors in parenthesis)
LOGLIKELIHOOD -198.529
NUMBER OF OBSERVATIONS 221
SINGT.K BIDDER, INCUMBENT 26
SINGLE BIDDER, CHALLENGER 10
COMPETITION, INCUMBENT WINS 107
COMPETITION, CHALLENGER WINS 52
SINGT.K BIDDER, NO INCUMBENT 5
COMPETITION, NO INCUMBENT 21
CONSTANT 65 -0.34
(0.55 )
NUM COMPETITORS' SYSTEMS 0.011
(0.008)
PROCURE SIZE 0.078
(0.053)
NUM ACQUISITIONS IN NETWORK 0.033
(0,024)
DEDICATED APPLICATION -0.08
(0.097)
CONSTANT 92 -2.46 **
(0.98 )
IBM INCUMBENT 0.90 **
(0.26 )
DOLLAR INVESTMENT -0.011**
(0.004)
SUM EXPERIENCE -0.21
(0.13 )
SUM EXPERIENCE2 0.028*
(0.015)
COMPUTER CAPACITY 0.007
(0.006)
CONSTANT 61 -2.98 **
(3.47 )
NUM INCUMBENT'S SYSTEMS 0.36 **
(0.14 )
NO INCUMBENT VENDOR 0.32
(0.47 )
PPP, P OF INCUMBENT WINNING 0.61 **
(.015 )
DELTA = 5 = (r*a5/a2) 3.91
(2.77 )
ALPHA = Q = ( *a2/al) 1.26 **
(0.57 )
Note: Estimates treat GE and Honeywell, RCA and Univac as merged.
Table 4
Derivatives with respect to exogenous variables
When IBM is not an incumbent:
P(CI,CC) P(SI) P(SC) P(CI) P(CC) P(f5) P(f2) P(fl)
NETWORK
COMPSYS
SIZE
INVEST
CAPACITY
INCSYS
AVEAGE
0.0214*
0.0042
0.0496*
-0.0002*
0.0001
0.0172*
-0.0003
-0.009 -0.012 0.034 -0.013 0.011 0.013 0.038
-0.004 -0.001 0.003 0.002 0.004 0.004 0.000
-0.022 -0.028 0.080 -0.030 0.026 0.030 0.088
0.001 -0.001 0.002 -0.002 0.000 -0.001 0.003
-0.001 0.001 -0.001 0.001 0.000 0.001 -0.002
0.004 -0.021 0.052 -0.035 0.000 0.000 0.075
0.002 -0.002 0.003 -0.003 0.000 -0.002 0.005
When IBM is an incumbent:
P(CI,CC) P(SI) P(SC) P(CI) P(CC) P(f5) P(f2) P(fl)
NETWORK
COMPSYS
SIZE
INVEST
CAPACITY
INCSYS
AVEAGE
0.0393**
0.0132**
0.0910**
-0.0031**
0.0020**
0.0006
-0.0054**
-0.037 -0.002 0.031 0,008 0.011 0.039 0.006
-0.013 -0.000 0.010 0.004 0.004 0.013 0.000
-0.087 -0.004 0.074 0.018 0.026 0.091 0.014
0,003 -0,000 -0.002 -0.001 0.000 -0.003 0.001
-0,002 0,000 0,001 0,001 0.000 0,002 -0,000
0,003 -0,003 0,007 -0,006 0.000 0.000 0.117
0.006 -0.000 -0.004 -0.002 0.000 -0.006 0.001
Note: All derivatives are for a site with mean values of all continuous
variables. All sites have an incumbent. All acquisitions are not for
ciedicateci applications unless otherwise stated. If V is the exogenous
variable and P(V) is the endogenous probability, then the above were
approxiated with [ P(1.01*V) - P(V) ]/[0.01*V].
Standard errors were computed for all derivatives, but are only
displayed for P(CI,CC), One star means that the t-statistic is greater than
1.64 and two stars means that the t-statistic is greater than 1.96.
See Figure 1 for definitions of outcomes. P(5) is shorthand for
probability that a challenger bids against another challenger. P(2) is the
probability that a challenger bids against an incumbent. P(l) is the
probability that an incumbent bids when no other firm bids. See Figure 2.
Table 5
Probability change from standard deviation increase in exog. variables.
When IBM is not an incumbent:
P(CI,CC) P(SI) P(SC) P(CI) P(CC) P(SI,CI)
COMPSYS 0.1099** -0.1094 -0.0005 0.0799 0.0300 -0.0294
INCSYS 0.0007 0.0030 -0.0037 0.0078 -0.0070 0,0108
NETWORK 0.1659** -0.1622 -0.0037 0.1283 0.0376 -0.0338
SIZE 0.1037** -0.1006 -0.0031 0.0814 0.0222 -0.0191
INVEST -0.0991* 0.1017 -0.0025 -0.0676 -0.0315 0.0340
CAPACITY 0.0411 -0.0435 0.0023 0.0255 0.0156 -0.0179
AVEAGE 0.0357 -0.0377 0.0019 0.0223 0.0134 -0.0153
DEDAP -0.1029 0.0957 0.0071 -0.0861 -0.0167 0.0096
IBMINC 0.1415** -0.1779 0.0363 0.0336 0.1078 -0.1442
When IBM is an incumbent:
P(CI,CC) P(SI) P(SC) P(CI) P(CC) P(SI,CI)
COMPSYS 0.0316** -0.0261 -0.0054 0.0191 0.0125 -0.0070
INCSYS 0.0304** 0.0063 -0.0367 0.0927 -0.0622 0.0990
NETWORK 0.0705** -0.0341 -0.0363 0.1181 -0.0475 0.0839
SIZE 0.0495** -0.0230 -0.0264 0.0818 -0.0322 0.0587
INVEST -0.0194 0.0388 -0.0194 0.0231 -0.0426 0.0620
CAPACITY -0.0004 -0.0129 0.0133 -0.0259 0.0255 -0.0388
AVEAGE 0.0000 -0.0113 0.0113 -0.0217 0.0217 -0.0330
DEDAP -0.0622 0.0247 0.0374 -0.0985 0.0363 -0.0737
Note: All computations are for a site with mean values of all continuous
variables. All sites have an incumbent. All acquisitions are not for
dedicated applications unless otherwise stated. If V is the continuous
exogenous variable, aV is one standard deviation, and P(V) is the
endogenous probability, then the above were calculated with [ P(V+aV) -
P(V) ]. If V is a dummy variable, as with DEDAP or IBMINC, then the above
were calculated with [ P(V=l) - P(V=0) ].
Only standand errors for the change in probabilities for competition
are displayed. One star means that the t-statistics were greater than 1.64
and two stars means that it was greater than 1.96.
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